We show that the introduction of a new asset affects the prices of previously existing assets in a market. Using data from 254 IPOs in 22 emerging markets, we find that stocks in industries that covary highly with the industry of the IPO experience a larger decline in prices relative to other stocks during the month of the IPO. The effects are stronger when the IPO is issued in a market that is less integrated internationally, and when the IPO is big. The evidence supports the idea that the composition of asset supply affects the cross-section of stock prices.
We study the effect of initial public offerings (IPOs) on the prices of other stocks listed in a market. We focus on emerging markets in order to explore quantitatively meaningful changes in asset supply. For each of 254 IPOs in 22 emerging markets, we measure excess returns on 17 industry portfolios in the market of issuance during the month of the IPO. We then regress the returns on the covariance between each industry and the industry of the IPO, as measured with returns on the 17 industries in historical U.S. data. We find a significant negative relation between returns and the covariance with the IPO industry. A strategy that takes a long position in the industry with the lowest covariance with the IPO industry and a short position in the industry with the highest covariance yields approximately 80 basis points over the month of issuance of the typical IPO. The effects are strong if the local market is poorly integrated with international markets, while they disappear if the market is well integrated. Furthermore, the cross-sectional gradient in response to the IPO is steeper when the new issue is big relative to the local market capitalization.
This paper provides direct evidence on the central role that market clearing and the supply side play in asset pricing, supporting recent theoretical and empirical interest on the issue.
The basic intuition is the same as in Bansal, Fang, and Yaron (2005) and Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2005) , namely that investors require higher expected returns for expanding sectors. As a sector grows with an IPO, its beta typically goes up, and therefore its price has to fall in order to promise higher expected returns. We add that this intuition is also true for sectors that have a high covariance with the expanding sector. In fact, the covariance with the growing sector governs the magnitude of the price change in the rest of the assets listed in the market.
It is not standard practice in asset pricing to talk about supply and demand because the implicit assumptions of perfectly elastic supply or demand dominate the literature. Supply is generally assumed to adjust to swings in demand, or in other words, supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic. Supply shocks are meaningless in such a world. The creation of a new asset is accompanied by the "destruction" of another asset (repurchases), so that in equilibrium prices stay determined by demand. In practice this rebalancing is not automatic, which gives rise to potential supply-side effects on asset prices. Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2005) study these effects in a framework where there are shocks to broad sectors, for instance, stocks and bonds or the stock markets of two different countries. However, the typical IPO in the U.S. is too small to be comparable to these sizeable supply shocks, so we can hardly expect to observe effects akin to the ones described in that paper following an IPO. For such small shocks, demand still looks almost perfectly elastic and, therefore, it eliminates any interesting effect on prices.
Our focus on emerging markets makes these insights applicable to the case of IPOs.
These markets are small and not perfectly integrated with international markets, making IPOs relatively bigger shocks. To some extent, these markets live in autarchy and, therefore, there is a market clearing condition for each of them.
The second advantage of studying emerging markets is that local demands for assets are expected to be more inelastic than in more developed markets, because the limits to arbitrage are more stringent (Shleifer (1986) , Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ). Standard factors that increase the elasticity of demand are, for example, restrictions to short-sales and the lack of close substitutes (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) ), which are probably more pervasive in these markets characterized by scarce liquidity and widespread insider ownership (La Porta et al. (2000) ). The existence of greater limits to arbitrage amplifies the effects of supply shocks beyond the frictionless demand-side benchmark considered in Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2005) .
Throughout the paper we remain agnostic about the determinants of the elasticity of demand. It is hard to disentangle simple segmentation from more sophisticated limits to arbitrage because the underlying causes of both are probably correlated. For instance, the same lack of liquidity keeps a market segmented and at the same time puts limits to arbitrageurs. Our main interest is in bringing attention to the effects of supply shocks. Irrespective of whether asset demand follows standard risk-return theories or behavioral theories-for lack of a better terminology-, the changes in prices after an IPO suggest that there is a role for supply not sufficiently studied.
Our focus on supply shocks is new to the literature. Previous studies have mostly documented the effect of demand changes in prices. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) show that stock prices increase on average when an emerging market opens up to foreign investors. Opening up the market provides a demand shock which induces a change in the value of local assets. This strategy is in essence the same strategy that Harris and Guerel (1986) and Shleifer (1986) use in the study of additions to the S&P 500-a particular segment of the larger U.S. market.
A close paper to ours is that of Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) who document that market-to-book ratios are negatively related to the ratio of total book equity to total personal income across U.S. states. We can interpret this ratio as a measure of the state's relative asset supply. Our approach differs in that, instead of only focusing on variation in the demand/supply balance derived from investors' geographical preferences (Coval and Moskowitz (1999) ), we consider an experiment where supply changes. We also exploit within market differences in returns and are thus better able to control for omitted variables.
Our focus on the effect of a new issue on the prices of other assets is related to Newman and Rierson (2004) , who show that a very large issuance of Deutsche Telekom depressed the prices of other European telecommunications bonds. Our paper differs from theirs in that we study stocks, we document how the effect declines in the cross-section of assets as they covary less with the IPO, and we use cross-country variation from emerging markets.
The next sections present a preliminary motivation (section 1) and a description of the methodology and the data (section 2). The results follow in section 3. We then conclude.
The Effect of a New Issue on the Prices of Other Assets: A Mean-Variance Approach
Assume that the CAPM holds and that each market is in autarchy. Expected returns on asset i are described by the following equation
Expected excess returns are equal to the beta of the asset times the local market risk premium. Under standard assumptions, Merton (1980) shows that the market risk premium can be Now assume that a new asset (the IPO) is introduced in the market. The market initially has i=1…n assets, so the IPO is asset n+1. We refer to the market with n assets as market 0, and to the market with n+ 1 assets as market 1. The weight of asset i in market 0 is denoted by 0 , i ω (analogously for market 1). We assume that the number of shares is constant and, therefore, that any change in the market weight comes from a change in price. With the introduction of the IPO, the covariance in the right hand side of equation (3) 
Equation (4) has two opposing terms. In order to simplify the interpretation, first consider the case of an asset that has zero covariance with the original n assets, but a non-zero covariance with the IPO. In market 0, the expected return on this asset is the risk free rate-the asset has no systematic risk. The change in expected return on this asset corresponds only to the first term in equation (4) . If the covariance with the IPO is positive, the asset receives a risk premium after the IPO; if the covariance is negative, the asset is a good hedge against the fluctuations of the IPO and it receives a risk discount. The magnitude of the effect is influenced by the weight of the IPO in the market, ipo ω , and by the price of risk given by the investor's risk aversion.
The second term in equation (4) tends to offset the effect of the first term. The intuition is the following. From the first term we know that an asset that covaries positively with the IPO receives a higher expected return, a lower price, and consequently a lower weight in the market (ceteris paribus). Therefore, assets with positive IPO covariance see their market weight decline according to the first term. But the decrease in market weight leads mechanically to a lower covariance of these assets with the new market and a lower risk premium, dampening the previous increase in risk premium. This second effect is likely to be of second order except for extreme cases. The extreme cases are similar to the examples in Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2005) where an increase in the market share of an asset lowers its expected returns, for instance, when the share is close to one. Bansal, Fang, and Yaron (2005) changes. We also study the impact of market segmentation, which can be understood as another way of varying the size of the IPO relative to the market. In a less segmented market the relevant market capitalization includes foreign assets, which amounts to say that ipo ω shrinks. In the extreme case of a fully integrated market (i.e. where the world market is the reference for the CAPM as in Karolyi and Stulz (2003) ), any IPO has necessarily a negligible size and therefore the change in expected returns in equation (4) is zero.
In this analysis we assume that the IPO creates a new source of wealth in the economy. In a mean-variance graph (see Figure 1 ), the addition of the new asset modifies the efficient frontier and therefore the market of risky assets. In such case it is clear that the IPO has a potential effect on other asset prices. On the other hand, Willen (2003) finds that the introduction of an asset in zero net supply (i.e. an asset that is not new wealth) leaves the prices of other risky assets unchanged. But even then, adding an asset that is not new wealth can affect other prices if we consider further frictions. For instance, an IPO leads to changes in prices in the case of a privately-held company whose owners are formerly liquidity constrained.
Event Study around IPO Dates

A. Data Sources
Stock prices come from the Emerging Markets Database (EMDB). We use dollar prices at the end of the month. We do not use daily data because many stocks are traded only sporadically in emerging markets so that we often observe zero daily returns. We form 17 valueweighted industry portfolios in each country following the industrial classification of Fama and French. 1 We define the market return as the value-weighted return on the EMDB stocks in the country during the month.
The IPO data come from Thomson Financial's SDC Platinum. We start with all common equity primary IPOs. We then restrict the sample to the issues where the firm is listing in its home 
B. Basic Regression and Identification
We conduct an event study around the date of the listing of new issues. Traditionally, event studies in the finance literature have focused on outcomes of the firm affected by or initiating the event. We instead concentrate on the evolution of the stock price of the other firms in the same national market. The regressions we estimate are of the following type: This is a reduced form regression so there is no direct mapping between the estimate for β and parameters in equation (4) such as the risk aversion coefficient.
We compute the covariance of returns between each pair of industries with U.S. monthly excess returns on Fama-French's 17-industry portfolios from 1974 to 2003. Table AII in the appendix presents the 17x17 covariance matrix with the 153 different covariances. Although imperfect due to the lack of a long time series and the dramatic changes in market structure, a country-specific covariance between industries could be computed. However, it is not a good idea to then run a regression with these covariances because, on top of being noisy, they are endogenous. The need for an exogenous measure of covariance can be understood by noting that the model presented in the previous section is a partial equilibrium model. First moments, or expected returns, are derived from second moments of returns that are taken as given. In reality, second moments are equally endogenous. Therefore, equation (4) cannot be estimated directly as a regression without further thinking about the identification problem.
Our whole approach hinges on the idea that supply and demand matter for asset prices, and therefore that covariances respond to the local structure of the market. In other words, covariances have embedded in them the characteristics of the segment where they are traded. For example, stocks added to the S&P500 exhibit changes in their degree of comovement with other stocks inside and outside the index (Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) ).
One example can illustrate the potential correlation between c i ε and the covariance computed with local data. Particularly in emerging markets, firms are usually organized in conglomerates because of the poor development of financial intermediaries. A high covariance between firms can in part reflect the existence of these internal capital markets (Lamont (1997) ).
In such case, an IPO can signal an alleviation of financial constraints for a whole set of firms within a conglomerate. In this example, the extent of internal capital markets is the omitted variable that is hidden in the error term and that is correlated with the local covariance.
Unfortunately, measuring these inter-firm links is virtually impossible, at least for a broad sample like the one we study.
Our identifying assumption is that the covariances in the U.S. capture the exogenous component of the covariances in each country. The U.S. market is a well-diversified, internationally-integrated market, with many arbitrageurs, and consequently a market where the covariances are potentially closer to fundamental measures of risk or behavioral degrees of substitutability between assets that do not rely on a particular market structure. Given that we exploit within IPO, cross-industry variation in the data, we just need the ranking of the interindustry covariances to be relatively stable across countries. For instance, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) show that stocks in less developed markets tend to be more correlated, which leads mechanically to higher covariances (ceteris paribus). However, even if all covariances are higher in some markets, our variable is valid as long as the ranking of comovement across industries does not change dramatically.
We concentrate on the within-country variation in the effect of the covariance by including IPO fixed effects that absorb the market-wide price fluctuation or any change in the risk-free rate. Being able to control for unobserved characteristics constitutes a major advantage of our empirical design, because the results are robust to omitted variables that vary along any combination of the country, year and IPO-industry dimensions. In particular, we shield ourselves from the potential biases due to market timing in new issues (Ritter (2003)) by focusing on the cross-section of price changes rather than the market price change. The need to control for country heterogeneity seems critical given the evidence on cross-country differences in valuations (La Porta et al. (2002) ) and IPO underpricing (Lungqvist (2004)), and the fact that these differences are not fully explained. We also take into account the fact that returns in the same country are potentially correlated across stocks and through time by allowing the residuals to be clustered within a country. Table I presents the results from the regression in (6) using returns on the month of the IPO. We measure abnormal returns in two ways in this table. First, we simply subtract the market return, which we call the market-adjusted return. Given the IPO fixed effects, it is equivalent to run regressions with market-adjusted returns or raw returns. Second, we compute the return in excess of a market-model return estimated with data from month t-30 to month t-7, where t is the month of the IPO. We lose approximately 10% of the observations with the second method because it requires a longer time series for each industry.
Empirical Results
A. Asset Prices Fall as the Covariance with the IPO Increases
The coefficient of the covariance with the IPO industry is negative and significant at the 5% level with both definitions of abnormal returns. The coefficient in the regression with marketadjusted returns implies that a one-standard deviation increase in the covariance reduces prices by 40 basis points. In order to put this number into perspective, consider that HML (the book-tomarket factor of Fama and French (1993) ) gives an average premium of 40 basis points per month.
An alternative way of quantifying these magnitudes is to use as independent variable the ranking of each industry in terms of its covariance with the IPO industry. Using the ranking is a way of controlling for possible non-linearities in the effect of the covariance. The results in Table   I indicate that moving one place closer to the IPO in the ranking lowers prices by 5.7 basis points (6.3 basis points when using market-model abnormal returns).
We find small changes in prices, which imply even smaller changes in expected returns.
This can be easily seen from the Gordon growth model for the price-dividend ratio: P/D = 1/(r-g).
Assume that the P/D ratio is 20. For given dividends, a change in prices of 40 basis points implies a change of only 2 basis points per month in expected returns. A back of the envelope calibration of our model gives similar magnitudes. Take the first term in equation (4), which is our main focus, and consider the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in the IPO covariance. Assume that the risk aversion coefficient is 100, consistent with the equity premium evidence, and that the IPO has the average size in the sample (0.25% of the country's market capitalization; see Table   AI ). Multiplying these terms gives that the change in expected returns is 1.5 basis points per month. We do not perform the tests with expected returns instead of prices because these tests would most likely lack power. The variance of returns is just too large relative to the size of the effect that we document.
Sometimes the changes in price are reported in terms of demand elasticities, particularly in the literature on index additions. If we assume that the IPO has the average size in the sample, a 0.40% change in prices implies an elasticity of -1.6. This number is within the range of previous estimates in the literature (see Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) for a survey).
Figure 2 summarizes the basic result graphically. For each IPO we compute the marketadjusted return on each of the 17 industries in the country during the month of issuance. We then rank the industries from 1 to 17 according to the U.S. covariance with the IPO industry (with 1 being the industry with the lowest covariance). Finally, we average the returns across all IPOs for each ranking position. These returns are then plotted against the ranking, along with a regression line. This figure shows a strong negative relationship between returns and the covariance of different industries with the IPO industry. It is clear that the effect does not come from a few outliers, but that it is a robust feature of the data. In particular, the effect is not derived from the difference between the same industry of the IPO versus the impact on other industries. The sameindustry data points (almost always corresponding to ranking position 17) can be discarded and a similar relationship holds.
The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the same average returns by ranking in the months before and after the IPO. The negative slope is no longer there. While during the month of the IPO the coefficient on the ranking is significantly negative (at the 2% level) and explains 30% of the variation in excess returns, it is insignificant and explains only 10% of the variation during the months before and after the issuance. Figure 2 suggests that the U.S. covariance is not just picking some permanent difference in expected returns between industries.
In Figure 3 we show our basic result in yet another way. For each IPO we compute separately the market-adjusted return on industries above and below the median of the IPO covariance. We then plot the entire distribution of returns for both groups of industries. The difference in means of the two distributions is quite apparent in the month of the IPO. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test easily rejects the null of equality of distribution functions with a pvalue lower than 1%. Once again, the effect is not present in the months before and after the IPO ( Figure 3B ). For each of these months the test fails to reject the null (at p-values of 46% and 75% for the previous and posterior month respectively). Table II confirms that the effect of the IPO covariance is exclusive to the month of the issue by running the same basic regression for the months before and after the IPO. In both cases the covariance is not significant and the coefficients are much smaller (in magnitude) than during the month of the IPO.
As an example of the basic effect, consider the price impact of the typical IPO in Transportation. An advantage of our methodology is that the event is not initiated by the firms for which we measure the change in the stock price. In fact, the industry returns in the dependent variable do not include the return on the issuing firm. In principle, the decision to issue equity can convey information about the future prospects of the firm (Myers and Majluf (1984) ) and can also directly affect future cash flows if credit constraints are important. It can be argued that these effects are relevant not only for the issuing firm but also for other firms in the same industry or close competitors (Chevalier (1995 ), Phillips (1995 ). The direct effect on cash flows or the information signaled about cash flows can affect the demand for assets and blur the effects of changes in expected returns that we point to in the model. We checked that the results are not driven by the competition within the same industry of the IPO by running regressions that exclude that industry and we obtained the same results as before. In terms of the informational story, we think that it is hard to argue that a single IPO conveys information-not previously known to markets-about the cash flows of all other industries in a country, and that the information is correlated with the covariance of returns measured in the U.S.
One caveat to our approach is that we measure price changes around the date of issuance of the new stock and not around the announcement date. If arbitrage is frictionless, the price effect should be observed when the issue is announced. At the date of announcement, arbitrageurs should do short-sales of industries with high IPO covariance and should go long in industries with low IPO covariance. Unfortunately, we do not have a practical way of identifying the announcement date because of the very nature of the process of public offerings. There is no certainty about the issuance when management announces plans to do it or files for it, rather the probability of issuance grows slowly in time and reaches its peak only on the actual date of listing. In other words, there is substantial risk in the strategy suggested above, which deters arbitrageurs from pursuing it (De Long et al. (1990) ). Measuring returns around the month, and not the day, of the IPO likely mitigates this concern. In any case, if the effects are concentrated around the announcement date and not the issuance date, then it is more difficult for us to empirically find the results we document.
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B. Other Factors in the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
There is the possibility that the IPO covariance proxies for some of the factors that are usually considered in cross-sectional regressions of stock returns, such as the market-to-book ratio or size. In Table III we study the effect of including alternative factors. We first consider the factors used by Fama and French (1992) , which are the log of market equity (ME), the log of the market-to-book ratio (P/B), the price-earnings ratio when earnings are positive (P/E(+)), and a dummy for those observations with negative earnings (E<0). These variables are measured 12 months prior to the IPO for each country-industry pair. Out of these four factors, the priceearnings ratio is the only one that enters significantly and with the expected negative sign. The market-to-book ratio has the right sign, but it is not significant. Size is not significant either and it has the wrong sign when compared to what is found in the U.S. The IPO covariance survives all of these controls in terms of magnitude and significance, hence, a high covariance with an IPO is not simply an indication of small size or high market-to-book (which is probably indicative of high growth opportunities).
Two other interesting factors are liquidity and momentum. Turnover is a proxy for liquidity risk, which may be a particularly discouraging factor to foreign investors when considering investing in emerging markets (Bekaert and Harvey (2003) , Lesmond (2005) ). We define turnover as the average over the 12 months prior to the IPO of value traded divided by market capitalization of each industry in each country. However, the coefficient on turnover is not significant and it has the wrong sign (i.e., negative).
Momentum, instead, is a robust predictor of returns. We measure momentum as a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the cumulative market-adjusted return over months t-6 through t-1 is positive; or in other words, when the industry under consideration is a winner in the 6 months prior to the IPO. 3 As seen in Table III , the momentum effect is very strong. Winners in the past 6 months earn, on average, an extra 1% during the IPO month. Even after including momentum, however, the coefficient on the IPO covariance remains significant at the 5% level and its magnitude is only slightly reduced.
IPOs tend to cluster around hot markets, that is, after a succession of positive returns. It has been suggested that managers exploit temporary windows of opportunity provided by market mispricing (Ritter (2003)). Under this hypothesis, we should observe IPOs clustered in industries with positive momentum. However, if this is the case, industries with a high covariance with the IPO will share the momentum and the high returns of the IPO industry. We show, instead, that high covariance industries have unusually low returns during the month of the IPO. In other words, a contagious IPO-industry momentum works against the negative effect of the high IPO-industry covariance. The results in Table III suggest that sharing the positive momentum of the IPO industry is not enough to overturn the negative effect of the market-clearing considerations.
C. IPO Size and Market Segmentation
In a deep market like the U.S. probably no IPO is big enough to have a significant effect in all other stocks. Emerging markets, instead, are much smaller in terms of total market capitalization and number of investors. The size of the average (median) IPO in our sample is $98 ($43) million, while the average (median) market capitalization is just $91 ($80) billion.
Perhaps more important is that, given the prevalence of government and insider control (La Porta et al. (2000)), market capitalization substantially overstates the value of stocks that are actually traded in these markets. Just to give a sense of the magnitude of the correction needed to account for this problem, the free-float market capitalization is only 14% of total capitalization in Chile. If we assume that this number is the same for all countries, then the average IPO represents just below 1% of the respective market free float.
As seen in equation (4), a bigger IPO amplifies the effect of the IPO covariance. The IPO fixed effects absorb any direct impact of size, but it can still interact with the covariance. In Table   IV we split the sample in three according to the dollar amount of the IPO relative to the total market capitalization. The coefficient on the IPO covariance increases (in magnitude) as we move from small to big IPOs. In fact, the effect is significant in the third of the sample that corresponds to the relatively big IPOs, and not in the other two sub-samples.
A second source of variation in size comes from the segmentation of the market.
Segmentation determines the extent of the demand for assets. For instance, investors from all over the world are potential participants in a perfectly-integrated market. We present two alternative measures of segmentation in Table V . These measures vary across countries and through time as opposed to other institutional features that vary almost exclusively across countries. The decade under consideration is a period of substantial changes in the segmentation of emerging markets so we prefer these time-varying measures (Bekaert and Harvey (1995) ).
Our first measure corresponds to the ratio of the investable IFC index to the global IFC index (Bekaert (1995) ). This ratio, which is available at the monthly frequency, shows the fraction of market capitalization in which foreigners can potentially invest. In the top panel of Table V we split the sample in three according to this ratio. The coefficient on the IPO covariance increases (in magnitude) as we move to more segmented markets. As seen in the first column, it is not significant in well-integrated emerging markets.
The middle panel of Table V presents results when splitting the sample according to market turnover. Low liquidity can be a deterrent to foreign investors and an important cause of segmentation. As expected, the effect of the IPO covariance is strong in less liquid markets, but missing in the most liquid ones.
So far we have focused on variation within emerging markets. In Table V we compare emerging markets as a group with those markets that are more developed and well-integrated according to the IFC classification. To conduct this exercise we gather stock price data from
Datastream to build the industry portfolios in 37 countries since 1990. We then match the returns to the SDC IPO data as before, and run the benchmark regression separately for emerging and developed countries. In the sample of emerging markets the results are comparable in magnitude and significance to our benchmark sample. As expected, there is no effect of the IPO covariance in developed markets. We consider this just as a robustness exercise because the number of stocks in Datastream is much smaller than in EMDB, and because we can only form equal-weighted portfolios since shares outstanding is not available.
D. Other Measures of Substitutability between Assets
The model presented in the introduction is a standard model of a risk-return tradeoff. The IPO changes the covariance of each asset with the market, which is the measure of risk, and therefore it commands a change in expected returns. Instead of focusing on traditional measures of risk, Barberis and Shleifer (2003) suggest that investors use easily observable characteristics such as size, the book-to-market ratio, or the industry, to classify assets. We can then speculate that, when a new asset appears, investors adjust their portfolios to reflect their desired exposure to the different styles within the market. Those assets that have a similar style compared to the IPO are substituted away more strongly than other assets. For example, an IPO can crowd out and lower the price of other stocks with similar book-to-market. This effect can potentially wipe out or complement the effect of the IPO covariance previously identified.
To explore this issue we classify assets according to the book-to-market ratio and size of each industry relative to the IPO industry in the month prior to the realization of the return. We say that an industry is close to the IPO if the absolute difference in the book-to-market ratio between the two is small, and analogously for size. Teo and Woo (2004) also use categories based on size and book-to-market in their tests of style investing.
In Table VI we show that the prices of industry portfolios that are close to the IPO industry in terms of book-to-market and size fall relative to other industries. This effect is again limited to the month of the IPO. The effect of size is stronger, and in fact it makes the book-tomarket variable insignificant when both are included together in the regression. The IPO covariance is still significant and its coefficient is of similar magnitude than the one in our benchmark regression.
In Table VII we see that the effects are concentrated in markets with medium and high levels of segmentation. In principle the impact of this second class of substitutability measures is not necessarily expected to be stronger in more segmented markets. Style investing can affect international investors as well as local investors. However, our evidence suggests that style investing may be even worse in markets dominated by local investors.
One problem with testing style investing is that the definition of style is always debatable. For instance, following the methodology for the IPO covariance, we also try the measure of book-to-market closeness with historical book-to-market ratios for U.S. industries.
However, this measure is never significant. We can argue that it is simply not a good measure of asset style, or not relevant for the participants in the market. In any case, its inclusion does not affect the coefficient of the IPO covariance (results not reported).
E. Volume Traded
As a final step, we examine the volume traded during the month of the IPO and the months around it. Table VIII shows that the IPO covariance significantly predicts higher volume in the month of issuance, both when measured as dollar volume and number of shares traded, and even after controlling for the high autocorrelation by including lagged volume (Lo and Wang (2000)) . The relationship is, in general, insignificant in the previous and following months (with one exception, where the covariance comes in significantly only at the 10% level). The evidence on volume, taken together with the evidence on price changes, suggests that the industries that covary highly with the IPO experience more selling pressure than other industries as investors rebalance their portfolios. However, other possibilities cannot be completely ruled out without more detailed data on order flows.
Conclusions
This paper shows empirically that changes in asset supply have a significant impact on the prices of assets in a market. Therefore, the constraints imposed by market clearing should not be ignored, as also suggested by Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2005) . We measure the 
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The dependent variable is the return of industry i in country c in excess of the local market return during a month (market-adjusted returns). The local market is defined as the value-weighted sum of all stocks in that country and month reported in the EMDB database. Results are shown for month t which is the month of the IPO. The independent variable is the covariance between industry i and industry j which is the industry of the IPO. This covariance is estimated with monthly industrial returns from U.S. stocks between 1973 and 2004. The industry definitions correspond to the 17 groups of SIC codes defined in Ken French's website. Market segmentation corresponds to the IFC investable index divided by the IFC global index. Market turnover is provided by the EMDB and it is the total value of traded shares over the total market capitalization in a month. The sample is split in three groups (low-medium-high) according to the 33-and 66-percentile of each measure. In the lower panel, return data from Datastream for companies in 37 countries are aggregated into industry portfolios with equal weights, and then split into developed and emerging markets as defined by IFC. The IPO fixed effects (α in the equation above) are not reported. Details on the selection of IPOs are provided in the text. Returns in the dependent variable are truncated at the 1% and 99% levels. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported below the coefficients. Significance (two-sided): ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
The dependent variable is the return of industry i in country c in excess of the local market return during a month (market-adjusted returns). The local market is defined as the value-weighted sum of all stocks in that country and month reported in the EMDB database. Results are shown for month t which is the month of the IPO, and for months t-1and t+1. The covariance between industry i and industry j, which is the industry of the IPO, is estimated with monthly industrial returns from U.S. stocks between 1973 and 2004. The industry definitions correspond to the 17 groups of SIC codes defined in Ken French's website. B/M (book-to-market) closeness is the negative of the log of the absolute difference between the B/M of industry i and industry j in the month before the realization of the return. Size closeness is defined analogously. The IPO fixed effects (α in the equation above) are not reported. Details on the selection of IPOs are provided in the text. Returns in the dependent variable are truncated at the 1% and 99% levels. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported below the coefficients. Significance (two-sided): ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
The dependent variable is the return of industry i in country c in excess of the local market return during a month (market-adjusted returns). The local market is defined as the value-weighted sum of all stocks in that country and month reported in the EMDB database. Results are shown for month t which is the month of the IPO. The covariance between industry i and industry j, which is the industry of the IPO, is estimated with monthly industrial returns from U.S. stocks between 1973 and 2004. The industry definitions correspond to the 17 groups of SIC codes defined in Ken French's website. B/M (book-to-market) closeness is the negative of the log of the absolute difference between the B/M of industry i and industry j in the month before the realization of the return. Size closeness is defined analogously. Market segmentation corresponds to the IFC investable index divided by the IFC global index. The sample is split in three groups (low-medium-high) according to the 33-and 66-percentile of market segmentation. The IPO fixed effects (α in the equation above) are not reported. Details on the selection of IPOs are provided in the text. Returns in the dependent variable are truncated at the 1% and 99% levels. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported below the coefficients. Significance (two-sided): ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Low
Medium High The dependent variable is the volume traded in industry i in country c during a month. For each month we present regressions with two alternative measures of volume. First, volume is defined as the dollar amount traded over total market capitalization. Second, volume is defined as the number of shares traded over total shares outstanding. To get to industry volume we value-weight firm-level measures of volume. Results are shown for month t which is the month of the IPO, and for months t-1and t+1. The main independent variable is the covariance between industry i and industry j, which is the industry of the IPO. This covariance is estimated with monthly industrial returns from U.S. stocks between 1973 and 2004. The industry definitions correspond to the 17 groups of SIC codes defined in Ken French's website. The IPO fixed effects (α in the equation above) are not reported. Details on the selection of IPOs are provided in the text. Robust standard errors clustered by country are reported below the coefficients. Significance (twosided): ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
